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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF HIGH-RISK
MEDICAL DEVICES
Rita F. Redberg, MD, MSc*
Medical devices play an ever-increasing role in medical care. The
pace of regulations to protect patient safety has not kept up with the
development and marketing of new medical devices. In fact, patient
safety protections have weakened in the last several years with the
emphasis to get “innovative” devices on the market faster. As a result,
there is, less premarket clinical study, and postmarket surveillance still
remains weak.
It is helpful to begin with a brief historical perspective of medical
device regulation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first be-
gan regulating devices with the 1976 Medical Device Amendments
(Amendments), after thousands of women were injured by the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.1 To accommodate the number of
medical devices in common use prior to 1976, the FDA framework
was rudimentary and meant to be expanded and strengthened. How-
ever, over forty years later the FDA framework still has not been
completed and is being progressively weakend. In fact, the current
trend of lowering evidentiary requirements for high-risk device ap-
proval through legislation such as the 21st Century Cures Act, new
proposed rules and regulations, and a rudimentary adverse event re-
porting framework will pose increasing threats to patient safety.
The Amendments established three categories of risk for FDA de-
vice approval.2 Only the highest risk category (Class III) goes through
premarket approval (PMA), which is the most rigorous pathway and
the only pathway to require clinical data.3 Approximately 1% of all
devices enter the market via PMA.4 Furthermore, a landmark study in
2009 by Dhruva et al. found that only a small minority of PMA de-
vices were supported by high-quality, randomized controlled trial
* Professor of Medicine at University of California, San Francisco.
1. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
2. Id. at 316–17.
3. Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in Premarket
Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2679 (2009).
4. Sarah Y. Zheng et al., Characteristics of Clinical Studies Used for US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Approval of High-Risk Medical Device Supplements, 318 JAMA 619, 620 (2017).
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(RCT) data.5 Very few of these trials were blinded, meaning they
could not determine if the benefit was due to the device or to the well-
known and powerful placebo effect of a procedure.6 Thus, many high-
risk devices are currently used without evidence of benefit from high-
quality, randomized controlled trials. Additionally, in 1976, many
high-risk devices were classified as Class II, an intermediate risk cate-
gory meant to be used for certain high-risk devices on a temporary
basis. Forty years later, high-risk devices remain in the intermediate
risk pathway, while some have been reclassified as lower risk Class II
devices.
After entering the market via the original PMA process, high-risk
devices can be modified through supplements to the PMA.7 These
supplements generally do not require clinical data.8 Some high-risk
devices enter the market via the 510(k) process, which uses the crite-
ria of being “substantially equivalent” to a device already on the mar-
ket and does not require clinical data.9 The FDA asked the venerable
Institute of Medicine (IOM)10 for advice on how to improve the safety
and effectiveness of the 510(k) process.11 After careful study and con-
sultation with many experts, the 2011 IOM report concluded that
safety and effectiveness was not a criterion for market entry in the
510(k) process.12 Therefore, there was no way to assure safety and
effectiveness of 510(k) devices and the IOM report determined this
pathway should be abandoned.13 In a startling and unusual move, the
FDA renounced the findings of the IOM report, and the 510(k) pro-
cess continues to be used for many high-risk devices today.14 For ex-
ample, when the Lariat device intended to be placed inside the heart
to tie off one of the cardiac structures (the left atrial appendage) en-
tered the market via the 510(k) process, it was judged as being sub-
stantially equivalent to the preformed sutures used during
5. Dhruva et al., supra note 3, at 2683.
6. Zheng et al., supra note 4, at 622; see also Dhruva et al., supra note 3, at 2683.
7. See generally Zheng et al., supra note 4. See also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319
(2008).
8. Zheng et al., supra note 4, at 620.
9. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319.
10. The IOM is now known as the National Academy of Medicine (NAM).
11. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEAR-
ANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS, at xi (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13150/chapter/1#ii. Named
after Section 510(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, this is a process by which the
majority of health care medical devices must be reviewed and approved by the FDA prior to
entering the market. Id.
12. Id. at xi–xii.
13. Id.
14. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA to seek public comment on IOM
recommendations (2011) (on file with agency).
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laparascopic surgery, even though this is a surgery that is not done in
the heart.15
The 21st Century Cures Act, passed in December 2016, further
weakened the evidence requirements for high-risk devices. This legis-
lation is intended to allow the FDA to accept anecdotal evidence in
support of high-risk device approval. Congress stated more emphasis
would be placed on post approval studies (PAS). However, our prior
work has shown that PAS are often not initiated at the time of device
approval, although that is the stated intent of the FDA.16 Few PAS
studies are completed and even less are published in peer review med-
ical journals.17 The FDA has never issued a warning letter or levied
any penalty related to study delays, inadequate progress on PAS, or
failure to comply with PAS requirements.18 The lowering of thresholds
for premarket evidence to support safety and effectiveness of high-
risk devices, along with severely limited postmarketing evidence col-
lection, all leads to increased chances of serious adverse events due to
dangerous devices.
Making this situation even more unsafe and scary for patients, there
is an extremely weak adverse event (AE) reporting system, such that
only 3%–6% of all AE are even reported.19 Physicians are not re-
quired to report adverse events, and the barriers for well-intentioned
physicians to report AE are high. Besides doing the right thing, there
is no incentive to report AE, and even when one wants to report, the
system is difficult to access and time-consuming. Legislation to man-
date physician reporting of AE, the Medical Device Guardians Act,
was introduced in the 2016 and 2017 Congresses.20 When hospitals re-
port AE, they generally report them to the device company and not
directly to the FDA. The device companies do have mandatory report-
ing, but it is at their discretion to decide if the event, even a serious
15. Saurav Chatterjee et al., Safety and Procedural Success of Left Atrial Appendage Exclu-
sion with the Lariat Device: A Systematic Review of Published Reports and Analytic Review of the
FDA MAUDE Database, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1104, 1107 (2015). A Netflix documentary
released in July 2018, The Bleeding Edge, tells the story of how many unsafe medical devices
have gotten on the market and the serious, adverse consequences. The Bleeding Edge, NETFLIX
(July 2018), https://www.netflix.com/search?q=the%20bleeding%20&jbv=80170862&jbp=0&jbr
=0.
16. Ian S. Reynolds et al., Assessing the Safety and Effectiveness of Devices After US Food and
Drug Administration Approval: FDA-Mandated Postapproval Studies, 174 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1773, 1774–78 (2014).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1776.
19. In 2012, physicians “report[ed] only 1% of adverse events.” Gina Shaw, Most Adverse
Events at Hospitals Still Go Unreported, HOSPITALIST (July 2012), https://www.the-hospitalist
.org/hospitalist/article/125141/most-adverse-events-hospitals-still-go-unreported.
20. Medical Device Guardians Act of 2016, H.R. 5404, 114th Cong. (2016).
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AE such as death, was related to the device. Karaca-Mandic, Ma, and
Marinovic found that companies did not meet their requirements for
reporting of serious AE 10% of the time, without any consequences
from the FDA.21 Thus, while device manufacturers may claim their
device is safe, that assurance is greatly weakened by the failure of our
adverse event reporting system to capture most events.
We know there is no reporting of many dangerous device-related
AE. Some have come to light due to litigation, press accounts, and AE
data collected in foreign countries—many of which have a much
stronger system for collecting this data and making it available. Re-
peatedly, it has taken several years before AE information, which
comes from the companies or involved institutions, was released to
the public and physicians. This included information relating to wide-
spread and serious device safety issues, such as duodenoscopes, infer-
ior vena cava filters, intracardiac cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD)
leads, and metal-on-metal hips. Manufacturers and hospitals delayed
making the AE publicly known, notifying doctors and patients, and
recalling the dangerous devices.22 The widespread lack of tracking of
AE means that the patient harm and deaths known to be related to
medical devices is likely a small fraction of the actual harm. Further-
more, the AE data that is collected is either very difficult to access
due to the FDA’s antiquated collection system, known as the Manu-
facturer and User Facility Device Experience (the MAUDE), or is
kept secret by private organizations, such as the professional society
registries that track devices. While there are research papers written
based on selective analyses of data from these registries, the data is
not publicly accessible and access is restricted. For example, Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) pays billions of dollars for
the implantation of defibrillators and left ventricular assist devices,
but it cannot access the registry collecting data about these same
devices.
21. Paul Ma et al., Drug Manufacturers’ Delayed Disclosure of Serious and Unexpected Ad-
verse Events to the US Food and Drug Administration, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1565, 1566
(2015); Rita F. Redberg, Improving Manufacturer Reporting of Adverse Events to the US Food
and Drug Administration, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1566, 1567 (2015).
22. Steven B. Danik et al., Timing of Delayed Perforation with the St. Jude Riata Lead: A
Single-Center Experience and a Review of the Literature, 5 HEART RHYTHM 1667, 1667 (2008);
Ratika Parkash et al., Failure Rate of the Riata Lead Under Advisory: A Report from the CHRS
Device Committee, 10 HEART RHYTHM 692, 694–95 (2013); James Walsh, St. Jude’s Durata Lead
is Facing New Questions, STAR TRIB. (June 5, 2013, 6:58 AM), http://www.startribune.com/st-
jude-s-durata-lead-is-facing-new-questions/210107621/; Concerns about Metal-on-Metal Hip Im-
plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241604 (last updated Dec.
28, 2017).
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There are great opportunities to better protect patient safety by im-
proving our oversight of high-risk devices, especially for an implanted
device. Discovering a safety problem with an implanted device carries
a greater risk for patients. Unlike a drug discovered to be associated
with adverse events, which can simply be stopped, an implanted de-
vice must either be removed in a risky procedure or left in the body
with the attendant risk. Thus, high-quality RCTs to assure safety and
effectiveness for high-risk devices prior to approval would go a long
way to improve patient safety and to ensure we are not recommending
unnecessary or harmful devices to patients. Once devices are ap-
proved, even on the flimsiest of data, they become entrenched in our
clinical practice, and it is very hard to change the culture. For exam-
ple, percutaneous coronary interventions, such as coronary stents,
have never been shown to be superior than medical therapy in a
blinded Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) for stable coronary ar-
tery disease.23 In fact, the recent ORBITA trial was the first blinded
trial to be done, and it found there was no benefit to a real stent com-
pared to a sham stent.24 This trial found that people who thought they
got a stent, but did not, did just as well as people who did receive a
stent in terms of treadmill time, quality of life measures, and relief
from angina.25 My accompanying editorial called for a change in prac-
tice and the current guidelines based on this high-quality trial, but
these needed changes have not occurred.26 This first blinded trial of
percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) occurred more than a
quarter-century after FDA approval of the Gianturco stent in 1992.27
This approval was based on a single arm study of a little over 300
patients.28 Several people died during the stent procedure, and more
went on to have bypass surgery.29 These patient outcomes were com-
pared to patients enrolled in an National Institutes of Health (NIH)
registry of angioplasty patients more than five years prior. Based on
this low-quality study, stents were launched into common medical use,
23. See generally Rasha Al-Lamee et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention in Stable Angina
(ORBITA): A Double-Blind, Randomised Controlled Trial, 391 LANCET 31 (2018).
24. Id. at 32, 36. ORBITA is the acronym for the Objective Randomised Blinded Investiga-
tion with optimal medical Therapy of Angioplasty with stable angina. Id. at 32.
25. Id. at 37.
26. David L. Brown & Rita F. Redberg, Last Nail in the Coffin for PCI in Stable Angina?, 391
LANCET 3, 4 (2018).
27. COOK, INC., SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS FROM THE GIANTURCO ROUBIN
CORONARY STENT 1 (1992).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 18–19.
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and millions have been placed in persons all over the world.30 Before
ORBITA, there were several studies that showed no benefit of PCI on
reducing myocardial infarction (heart attacks) or deaths, but the prac-
tice continued largely unabated.31 The most recent (and first blinded)
trial of PCI found that there was no benefit to actual PCI compared to
a sham PCI, and there were risks to the PCI procedure.32 However,
again, this high-quality RCT has been met with scathing attacks
largely from the interventional cardiology community.33 It is very dif-
ficult to change practice and minds once a practice becomes estab-
lished in the medical culture, as PCI has. Ironically, it was
complications from a coronary stent that led to the Supreme Court
decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, which established that preemption
prevents patients who have suffered serious injury or death from suing
a PMA device manufacturer.34
There is great opportunity for patients, physicians and health pro-
fessionals, and regulatory agencies to improve patient safety of medi-
cal devices. Patients and clinicians must demand high-quality evidence
and FDA approval before use of high-risk devices. Adverse event re-
porting must become part of the medical culture, and the data must be
easy to report and access. Innovation is important, but evidence is
needed to know if a device is innovative or is actually dangerous.
Once devices reach the market, it is so hard to slow down the use of
ineffective or even dangerous devices. Thus, it is essential to rebalance
our current system to make patient safety the highest priority.
30. Liz Szabo, Stents Open Clogged Arteries of 1M Americans Annually, USA TODAY (Aug. 6,
2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/06/bush-stent-heart-surgery/2623
111/.
31. William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy with or Without PCI for Stable Coro-
nary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 1509–11 (2007).
32. Brown & Redberg, supra note 26, at 3. See generally Al-Lamee et al., supra note 23.
33. Tricia Ward, ORBITA: Sham PCI Trial Sends Stents and CardioTwitter Reeling, MED-
SCAPE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/889670.
34. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008).
